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I
It has been twenty years now since Dean Pound pointed out how
inadequately the legal machinery performed the work of the law, and
how the general attitude of the public toward law reflected that failure
by a decrease in respect for law and for law enforcing agencies'. The
past decade has witnessed a concerted effort on the part of the legal
profession to improve the efficiency of the administration of justice
through revisions of codes of procedure and rules of practice. Judicial
Councils have been formed, self-governing bars have been advocated, the
rule-making power for courts has been sought and obtained in some
jurisdictions, and the bar generally has awakened to the need for pro-
cedural reform, with a result that already marked improvement is to be
noied and movements are afoot to still further perfect the functioning
of the administrative equipment which our system affords.
Again, there are the tremendous projects now under way for the
systematizing and restating of the legal materials which constitute our
jurisprudence. Vast sums have been made available and are being ex-
pended to unify our law and mold it into a usable and coherent body.
The work of the American Law Institute gives indications of producing
results comparable only to those of the most outstanding compilation and
reorganization programs of legal history.
We are witnessing tremendous strides in adjusting our law, in
certain notable phases, to produce results of certain gratifying uniformity
throughout the several jurisdictions of the country. The work of the
various commissions on uniform state laws and the results obtained under
the uniform sales act and the negotiable instruments act bear witness to
the convenience and desirability of these achievements. Alongside of
these movements, there has emerged a certain trend toward a definite
philosophy of law which has actually produced a new era in other
branches of law. The socializing influence of the philosophical view-
points of legislator and judge, as well as scholar and theorist, have had
revolutionary effects in the fields of torts and constitutional law. It
is only necessary to refer to the growth of such ideas as the doctrine of
reasonable or "natural" user, 2 the oscillation in the application of the
rule in Rylands v. Fletcher,3 the tendency to place liability for damage
where it can be most widely distributed as in the case of liability of
manufacturer to consumer for injuries resulting from the use of machin-
ery,4 workmen's compensation acts and employer's liability laws, to see
*The substance of this paper was presented to the North Dakota Bar Asso-
ciation in an address delivered at Grand Forks, September 8, 1927.
"*Associate Professor of Law, University of North Dakota.
'Pound, Need for Sociological Jurisprudence, 19 GREEN BAG, 607 (1907).
'See Giles v. Walker, L. R. 24 Q. B. D. 656 (1890); cf. CLaRK AND
LINDSEI.. TORTS, (7th ed.) 425. Cf. also Huffcut, Percolating Waters; The
Rule of Reasonable User, 13 YALE L. J. 222 (1904).
'Cf. Bohlen, The Rule in Rylands and Fletcher, 59 U. OF PA. L. Rav. 298,
373, 423 (1911). See POUND, INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL HISTORY, 107 ff.
(1923).
'Cf. MacPherson v. Buick Co., 217 N. Y. 382, 111 N. E. 1050 (1916).
See also Feezer, Social Justice in the Field of Torts, 11 MINN. L. REv. 313,
323 (1927).
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the effect of this philosophy in the law of torts. Perhaps even more
significant, however, are such decisions as those which uphold hours of
labor legislation,5 service letter acts,6 regulation of wage payment acts,7
sterilization of mental defectives acts,8 zoning ordinances,9 and minimum
wage laws'0 prior to Adkins v. Children's Hospital.-
But in spite of these tendencies and achievements, it cannot be
denied that the attitude of the lay public has been intensified in the
position of which Dean Pound complained several years ago. The moral
stigma attached to law violation has been, in an astonishing measure,
eradicated. Respect for law and for courts of justice seems waning
rather than increasing. As an agency for social control, the law is
apparently more inadequate than ever before in our history. No one is
satisfied with law unless it is the lawyer. The public attitude has, of
course, a tendency to perpetuate itself by a process of intra-action. Press
accounts of crime and law violation, as well as flippant journalistic atti-
tudes toward courts and legislatures have their effect upon the social
mind to accentuate general disrespect for those agencies. 12  Jurists and
publicists have remonstrated vigorously but the'realistic observer is con-
vinced that such conditions are increasing both in prevalency and in
intensity.
But there is, about this, little mystery. In spite of the reform
movements and progressive trends in law, there are yet defective spots
left untouched. At the beginning of the present era of industrial,
economic and social expansion, it was apparent to many that procedural
reform must be accompanied by the substantive development of the law.
It had to keep pace with the times. The processes of growth and re-
adjustment which are taking place in the legal order at present meet
those demands only in part. The program to secure uniformity in some
branches of the law has touched an acute economic problem and has met,
to a wide extent, the demands arising out of increased transportation
facilities and general commercial and industrial development. The re-
organization of our methods of procedure is alleviating the congestion of
judicial business and helping to remove the general dissatisfaction bound
to result from tedious delays and inefficient handling of litigation. The
great work of the American Law Institute, after all, is but an effort to
put in convenient and available form the dogmas of the law, for it
concerns itself exclusively with the logical consistency of those dogmas.
The new social philosophy indicates the growth of sociological theory and
'Mullei v. Oregon, 208 U. S. 412, 52 L. Ed. 551, 28 Sup. Ct. 324 (1908);
Radice v. New York, 264 U. S. 292, 68 L. Ed. 690, 44 Sup. Ct. 325 (1923).
'Prudential Insurance Co. v. Cheek, 259 U. S. 530, 66 L. Ed. 1044, 42
Sup. Ct. 516 (1922).
'St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. R. Co. v. Paul, 173 U. S. 404, 43 L. Ed. 746,
19 Sup. Ct. 419 (1899); Knoxville Iron Co. v. Harbison, 183 U. S. 13, 46
L. Ed. 55, 22 Sup. Ct. 1 (1901); McLean v. Arkansas, 211 U. S. 539, 53 L.
Ed. 315, 29 Sup. Ct. 206 (1909); Rail Coke Co. v. Ohio Ind. Comm., 236
U. S. 338, 59 L. Ed. 607, 35 Sup. Ct. 359 (1915); besides a score of deci-
sions in the state courts.
'Cf. opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes in Buck v. Bell, 47 Sup. Ct. 584 (1927).
See Baker, Constitutionality of Zoning Ordinances, 20 ILL. L. REV. 213
(1925).
"See Stettler v. O'Hara, 69 Or. 519, 139 Pac. 743 (1914). Cf. Powell,
The Oregon Minimum Wage Cases, 32 POL. Sc. Q. 296 (1917).
"Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U. S. 525, 67 L. Ed. 785, 43 Sup.
Ct. 394 (1923).
"Cf. Highfill, Effect of News of Crime and Scandal Upon Public Opinion,
17 JR. CR. L. 6 CR. 40 (1926).
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its effect upon those who make and administer law, but it is exactly
here that the limitations of the present legal order and the equipment of
that order appear obvious. The trouble lies, where it is so often to be
found, in the difficulties encountered in the application of theories which
the best legal minds of the age do not hesitate to espouse, and it is
precisely this difficulty that lends such plausible speciousness to the
skepticism of those who resist any effort to impose philosophical idealism
into legal practice. There is great weight in the objection that theory
which does not work and cannot be applied is useless.
The problem, then, is in the application of new and twentieth
century legal theory to the materials with which the law must deal. Here
it is that law has fallen down, and here it is that a share of the
popular unrest and dissatisfaction with courts and law has its roots. In
short, except in certain exceptional branches where ingenuity has devised
partial methods of correcting this defect, law is not producing desirable
results and, on the whole, is far behind progress made in every other
field of knowledge. Law is not scientific, in any sense, within the
modern meaning of the term and in the light of theories which juristic
philosophy itself has developed. It is not scientific because its method
is not the method of science.
In the editorial column of a current technical journal, it is flaunted
at the legal profession that "the lawyer is not even recognized as a
scientist." 13 This is not only a challenge to the lawyer to take stock
of his methods, but it indicates the gulf that has already separated the
law from disciplines with which it should be working hand in hand. If
as Pearson has put it, the scientific method is one and the same in all
branches, and that method is the method "of all logically trained minds,"
it must be obvious that jurists must not confine their logic to the
technique of developing the dogmas of the law, but must employ it as
well in the application of those dogmas, if law is to keep abreast of other
sciences which, to a large extent, deal with the same materials.
Lawyers have begun to recognize the dependence which law must
eventually place upon the social and allied sciences. We are all en-
trenched in the philosophic position that law, after all, is primarily but
one of many agencies for social control and that its ends must be sought
in the welfare of the social group. Law is the product of a civilization,
and the social order must be the mistress which the law seeks to serve.
We believe that our society can be molded and developed to conform to
our political and social ideals. Neither social nor individual fatalism is
popular among scientists. In fact, up to date sociological theories are at
the opposite pole from fatalism. As lawyers, we have faith that law
can be consciously employed to assist in the realization of desired social
ends. We cannot, then, fail to recognize and to formulate those ends
and employ machinery and methods which are calculated to intelligently
engineer the attainment of them. In doing this, there must be no failure
to take salutary advantage of, and to actively create opportunities for
utilizing the discoveries made by researches in other fields.14
In the effort to adequately protect the conflicting social interests
involved whenever these conflicts come within the domain of effective
"a22 JR. OF AB. & SoC. PSYCHOLOGY 1 (1927).
"4Cf. Green, The Path of Law School Development, 5 N. C. L. REV.
124, 129 (1927). Cf. also, Jervey in NEw YORK TIMES, Feb. 27, 1927.
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legal action, obviously the ultimate problem 'raised is how to accurately
evaluate the various social interests and ends involved. The constant
issues raised in criminal law, the problems presented in legislation, and
in preventative justice, as well as in torts and constitutional law con-
stantly demand the performance of this process by courts and legislatures.
This is obviously work which demands a science with principles and ef-
fective methods. Dean Pound has declared, with reference to legislation:
"How to . . . take account of the legal background on which the
courts will project it when they come to apply it, how to insure that all
the interests involved have been, as it were, inventoried and valued and
delimited so as to secure the most that may be with the least friction and
the least waste, is a problem of social engineering calling for as great an
equipment of pure science and as much creative resource as any problem
of electrical or mechanical engineering that has been solved in whole or
in part through the research carried on in our highly endowed labora-
tories."15
It has been a great many years since Mr. Justice Holmes voiced the
sentiment that ultimately science must prevail in law, as elsewhere. "I
have in mind," he said, "an ultimate dependence upon science because
it is finally for science to determine, so far as it can, the relative worth
of our different social ends, and, as I have tried to hint, it is our
estimate of the proportion between these, now often blind and uncon-
scious, that leads us to insist upon and to enlarge the sphere of one
principle and to allow another gradually to dwindle into atrophy."' 1
But just what have the social and allied sciences to offer the law
and of what significance is their work to the immediate application of
law? Again, is it possible, with the legal materials which we have at
hand for law to avail itself of work done in these fields? These are the
practical questions which seduce the interest of those whose work and
experience bring them into actual contact with the functioning of the
legal system. It is the answer, in part, to such questions that I shall
venture to direct your attention at this time.
II
In the light of modern juristic doctrines, no lawyer will deny that
the phenomena with which the law and sociology deal are to a great
extent the same. The relationship between the two is therefore obvious.
The sociologist, in examining the effects of social institutions upon the
individual is vitally interested in the law, as a mechanism controlling
human conduct. The law, looking toward the attainment of social ends,
cannot afford to ignore the findings of the sociologist. But in the light
of recent research sociology has claimed for its own many phases of
human knowledge which we had grown accustomed to think of as be-
longing exclusively to other sciences. Thus the relationship of sociology
and biology has given rise to an overlapping of the two sciences, a sort
of social biology, which manifests itself in various directions. A great
deal of dispute and a corresponding divergence of theories has quite
naturally resulted among those directly concerned in this work. But the
fact of disagreement and the conflict of opposing theories in no way
indicates that no progress has been made. On the contrary, it is only
15Speech before the Chicago Bar Association, 1926.'Law in Science-Science in Law, COLLECTED PAPERS, 210, 242 (1920).
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by such conflicts, with their constant checking and rechecking of results
that measurable progress has ever been made. Science never becomes so
sterile as when scientists are in complete agreement.
The newer schools of sociology seem to have definitely abandoned
older notions of biologic determinism and are insisting upon a technique
differing from that of biology, because, as they insist, of the funda-
mentally different processes studied. Nevertheless those who go farthest
in this direction readily concede the inevitability of taking basic biologic
factors into account in explaining the cultural processes which result in
sociological phenomena.1 7 Aside from the relationship of biology to
sociology with respect to its general discipline, one phase of the over-
lapping has developed into what may be regarded as a distinct science,
and one which has an especially profound significance to the lawyer. I
refer to the science of eugenics, drawing both from sociological, and
genetical knowledge.
The importance of this branch of science to the legal profession
cannot be better illustrated than by the ridiculousness of a situation
which exists in North Dakota. During the past session of the legislature,
some tinkering was done with our sterilization of mental defectives act'8
which has been, for a dozen years, a dead letter on our statute books.'9
Before the examining board which is provided for in the act shall make
a recommendation for an operation, it shall "examine into the innate
traits, the mental and physical conditions, the personal records and the
family traits and history of all persons reported." The trained biologist
must smile at the naivete of our legislators. And yet, here is significant
indication that the lawmakers must have felt the futility of such legisla-
tion unless it were administered in a scientific manner.
The truth is it is a complete impossibility to intelligently comply
with the directions in the statute for the sufficient reason that there are
no records of family traits to inquire into, no family histories to examine,
and no data from which the delinquent's innate traits can be determined.
Only by a systematic and scientific process of compiling eugenical
materials could this law possibly be effectively administered. An accurate
genealogical background is quite obviously necessary to the eugenical
study of a family. The pedigree must be studied carefully, together
with vast quantities of eugenical data and statistics. Without such
study, no sound basis for prediction and consequently no rational ad-
ministration of this law can be attained.
Now it is by no means certain that such families as the Kallikaks
and the Jukeses prove as much as scientists, at one time thought that
they proved. Modern discoveries and experiments in behavioristic psy-
chology and in psychiatry have tended to modify premature conclusions.
Yet there is no dispute as to the proposition that the story that eugenics
and biology tell is of vital significance to sociology and to psychology so
far as the physical equipment of the individual affects those sciences and
so far as the physical improvement of the race is concerned. 20
"Cf. Sutherland, The Biological and Sociological Processes, 32 AM. JR. OF
SOCIOLOGY, 58 (1926).
"Laws 1927, ch. 263; SESSION LAWS (Pop. Ed.) 433 ff.
"See Cooley, Some Phases of 1927 Legislation in North Dakota, 1 DAK.
L. REV. 65 (1927).
"How heavily the behaviorists lean on genetics must compensate for their
rejection of the thesis of the biologic determinists. Cf. WATSON, BEHAVIORISM,
82-83 (1925).
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There is not much need to remind a group of lawyers how much
the law depends upon economics. The direct contacts of the two are so
common as to almost daily come to the attention of the practitioner in
one way or another. Lawyers sometimes get the idea that economics
is indeed the entire basis of the law.21 The necessity for the application
of scientific economic theory is all well enough known and appreciated
by lawyers who have come in contact with public utilities and their
rate-making activities. But there is also the equally important, if
indirect, contact of economics and the law, through sociological processes.
The sociologist has realized what his science has in common with
economics, and we are witnessing what gives promise of the development
of a science within a science in the interest displayed in human ecology
which concerns itself with the study of the spatial groupings of persons
and of human institutions.22 Here again is a field which will, when more
fully exploited, have much of interest for the law and the lawyer.
What psychology and psychiatry has done for the law is not easy
to say for the reason that lawyers and those who administer law have
not yet learned how to make proper use of psychological knowledge.
When this has been mastered, it will unquestionably appear that what
has been here done from criminal law is inestimable. Post-war tests
have convinced us that the proportion of delinquents which can be
classed as feebleminded is comparatively small,23 contrary to ideas which
prevailed a dozen years ago. Recent researches with children have
disclosed the fact that defective mentality is relatively small among
juvenile delinquents. 24  In fact it has been found that of a given number
of delinquent children, the mental age of those who were stealers was
significantly higher than those who were not known to steal.25  Investi-
gations at certain prisons have demonstrated the striking fact that in
many cases the average mentality of the criminal was considerably higher
than that of the guards in whose charge he was placed. Enough, at
least, has been proven to valuably recheck older notions and to explode
the idea that criminality could be eliminated by the extermination of
feeblemindedness and low grade intelligence.
It cannot be inferred, however, that abnormal mentality has no
relation to crime. Feeblemindedness is itself a curse to society from
points of view other than the criminal, and while feeblemindedness may
not be the chief factor in crime, still when coupled with nervous dis-
orders, it produces results which bear directly upon crime. Recent
clinical studies in various states indicate a large proportion of mental
and nervous abnormalities among the criminal class which cannot be
overlooked. The work of Dr. Healy in Chicago, 26 Dr. Glueck in Sing
'Note the title of a current article, Economics, the Basis of Law, M. L.
Litchman, 61 AM. L. REV. 357 (1927).
'See McKenzie, The Scope of Human Ecology, 32 AM. JR. OF SOCIOL-
OGY 141 (1927).
"See MURCHISON, CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE, Part I (1926); see also
McKenna, Are Inherited Mental or Emotional Defects the Principal Cause of
Criminal Delinquency? 1 DAK. L. REV. 2 (Issue no. II, 1927); Cf. 15
MEMOIRS NAT. ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, 800 (1921).
'See Riddle, Stealing as a Form of Aggressive Behavior, 22 JR. OF AB. &
SoC. PSYCHOLOGY 40, 43-44 (1927).
"Ibid, tables pp. 48, 49, and summary pp. 50, 51.
"See his, THE INDIVIDUAL DELINQUENT (1915).
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Sing,27 Dr. Jacoby at the Naval Prison at Portsmouth,28 the New York
State Commission of Prisons investigation,29 and studies by the National
Committee for Mental Hygiene30 have all indicated that the biologist
and psychiatrist together may hold an important index to a happy
solution of the complicated problem.
The older psychology, committed to the theory that in the chromo-
somes of the fertilized egg are to be found the determiners which
eventually control the responses of the individual to certain stimuli, has
definitely given way to a new ground which has made it possible to
abandon the notion of "instincts" for the newer theses of the behaviorists.
Instincts, as a concept, has not been wholly discarded. It is still
certainly the subject of much controversy,"' but it is just as certain that
the theory of neural heredity and the transmission, through the germ-
plasm of the organism, of "preformed bonds" which must result in
definite behavior under certain conditions, has received serious modifica-
tions since the days of Herbert Spencer and Darwin.
Recent literature has pointed out that the older "nativeist" psy-
chologists had assumed positions which were not maintained by biologists
and embryologists themselves. 32  The new school of behaviorists, headed
in America by Watson, assume the basic thesis that practically all
reactions of individuals to the stimuli found in our social relationships
are determined by acquired or learned neural habits rather than by
instincts inherited through the germ-plasm.'
3
Behavioristic psychology has appealed strongly to scientists because
it has directed psychology away from older shibboleths of consciousness
and instincts, and has objectified the science by insisting upon the study
of acts and conduct, as a whole, without the older over emphasis upon
the central nervous system. It is more interested in external conduct
directly than in psychic states. As the philosopher will put it, its chief
advantage, as a science, lies in its refusal to speculate through the use
of metaphysical concepts, and thus its avoidance of the epistemological
curse.3 4 It may be too soon to appraise the results of behaviorism, but
we cannot but commend the methods of investigation which it employs,
nor can we fail to concede that such conclusions as it ultimately may
establish will be based upon demonstrable evidence which, like that of
the exact sciences which it emulates, will "appeal to all logically trained
minds."
"See PARSONS, CRIME AND THE CRIMINAL, 115 (1926); see Glueck, A
Study of 608 Admissions to Sing Sing Prison, 2 MENTAL HYGIENE Jan. 1918.
See A. A. Jacoby, Psychiatric Material in the Naval Prison at Ports-
mouth, 12 U. S. NAY. MED. BUL. no. 3 (1918).
'See Mental Disease and Delinquency, Reprint by Com. for Mental Hy-
giene. See Parsons, supra p. 120.
'See Parsons, supra, 122 ff.
'For a few references, see Woodworth, A Justification of the Concept of
Instinct, 22 JR. OF AB. & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 3 (1927); Kuo, A Psychology
Without Heredity, 31 PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW, 427 (1924); Kantor, The
Problem of Instincts and Its Relation to Social Psychology, 18 JR. OF As. 6
Soc. PSYCHOLOGY, 50 (1923). See also references in Heredity and Environ-
ment; Are They Antithetical? by Carmichael, 20 JR. OF AB. &. Soc. PSYCHOL-
oGY 245, 247, n. 10 (1925).
"See Carmichael, supra, 250 ff.
'WATSON, BEHAVIORISM, 77 ff.
UCf. Mead, The Genesis of the Self and Social Control, 35 INT. JR. OF
ETHICS, 251, 252 (1925).
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The effect which such study will have upon sociology and law can
be readily detected from some of the premises which it has set up. If
men decide that the human orgamsm should behave in such and such
a way, they must arrange situations of such and such kinds.8 5 It is
the business of behavioristic psychology to be able to predict and to
control human activity.36 It has as its objective to be able, once given
the stimulus, to predict the response, or from the givcn reaction, to
derive the stimulus that called out such a reaction.87 At present when
society wants to get rid of certain reactions, or when it attempts to
substitute one reaction for another, it goes about it blindly with no
scientific or rational basis for predicting the results. Behaviorism attacks
the problem of furnishing the grounds for such prediction.
While the extreme versions of behaviorism are avoided by many
of the more conservative psychologists, no less a scholar than Ellwood
has rejected the mysticism of the "instinct" and accords to man's in-
heritance merely "instinctive tendencies" to reactions which will be
realized in actual conduct according to the social conditioning to which
he is subjected,38 which is fundamentally, a behavioristic ground. He,
like Ward, looks forward to the scientific guidance of the processes of
social transitions and transformations.3" Eventually, and not far distant,
the position must be taken in which the basic truths of heredity and
environment will not be regarded as opposite poles from which to essay
the study of psychological phenomena. Already in the literature, this
idea is demanding attention.40
Psychopathology and psychiatry are making remarkable contributions
to the totality of knowledge which the law should utilize. Vast quanti-
ties of statistics are being compiled in the effort to study the effect upon
delinquency of emotional instability and other psychopathic conditions. 41
It is now possible to interpret pathological reactions in terms of thought
processes which are lucid and familiar to the ordinary psychologist and
to work out methods of treatment which are both simple and effective.
42
It must be remembered that the methods employed here also are those of
the exact scientists. 43 These newer schools all have the advantage of
demonstrating their findings by observations in concrete cases. There
can be but one result, and that result is observable progress. Their
technique is being perfected and older methods of guess work have been
"See WATSON, BEHAVIORIsM, 7 (1925).
'Watson, ibid. 11.
'Watson, ibid. 16."See his PSYCHOLOGY OF HUMAN SOCIETY, 278 (1925).
'See Barnes, Sanity in Social Psychology, 11 JR. OF APPLIED SOCIOLOGY,
240, 244 (1927).
'0See Carmichael, supra.
' 1See eg. Slawson, Psychoneurotic Responses of Delinquent Boys, 20 JR.
OF AB. & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 261 (1927). The relation of Crime and con-
stitutional psychopathy is recognized. What is designated as constitutional
psychopathic inferiority is believed to be an important factor in delinquency.
See Orbison, 10 JR. OF DELINQUENCY 428 (1926).42See the remarkable analysis of the "hand-biter", a sophomore at the
University of North Carolina, as described by Bagby, A Compulsion and Its
Motivation, 22 JR. OF AB. & SoC. PSYCHOLOGY 8 (1927).43Note, for example, the extensive and inclusive program for the study
of feeble-mindedness formulated by Johnstone, Dirctor of the Training School
at Vineland, N. J., including experts in embryology, biochemistry, endocrin-
ology, neurology, clinical pathology, enterology and pediatrics, anthropology
and ethnology. Johnstone, A Research Program for the Study of Feeble-
Mindedness, 20 JR. OF AB. & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 157 (1925).
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relegated to the discard. The methods employed are the best advocates
of this type of study. Lawyers can no longer afford to ignore these
fields. Rational men cannot refuse to believe in demonstrable facts.
Methods of research in these sciences establish for them a res ipsa loquitur
situation. Indeed, the evidence is such as not merely to warrant a
reasonable belief in the ultimate findings established, but to compel such
belief by all logically trained minds. Even the prejudices of religion
cannot stem the sweeping tide of science. It is not surprising to find
Jesuit priests and eminant protestants alike espousing and advocating the
newer dynamic psychology and neurology.44 Can lawyers refuse to
recognize and utilize it?
Social psychology is fast developing into a distinct branch of science
in itself. Older notions upon which were based certain schools of
psychology, such as Tard's idea of imitation and Ross's theory of sug-
gestion, although undoubtedly useful concepts, have not been able to
satisfactorily explain the processes by which human minds have reacted
to form social institutions and how they have, in turn, reacted to these
institutions. Eloquent pleas are being voiced for the complete reorgan-
ization of methods into a definite psychology of social institutions,45 all
of which again must compel the attention of those interested in the
progress of the law.
In political behavior, too, studies of clear import can be, and are
being made. Already it has been demonstrated how relatively unim-
portant are rational factors when compared with habit, tradition and
other psychological elements in political conduct. Especially is this true
in struggles between groups which are fundamentally class conflicts.
Thus, it is shown how futile must be any scheme which presupposes the
possibility of the harmonious working out of such problems as that of
capital and labor, through the cooperation of the two classes.46
Criminologists who have approached their problems from the socio-
logical point of view have not been slow to avail themselves of these
discoveries. During the past year a great deal of genuinely superior and
sound literature has appeared in this field, written not by idle theorists,
sentimentalists and professional reformers, but by men endowed with a
rich scientific insight and, in many cases, supported by years of observa-
tion and experience in direct contact with the criminal classes.47
All modern criminologists who have investigated the subject with
any degree of thoroughness from the sociological viewpoint are agreed
that the horrible idea of vengeance, out of which our criminal jurispru-
dence grew, resting upon mediaeval notions of theology, must go.48  In-
telligent scholars have demanded that our whole concept of "punishment"
should be abandoned as a relic of the dark ages. On the other hand the
"Eg. BARRETT, THE NEW PSYCHOLOGY: How IT AIDS AND INTERESTS
(1925); MAN: HIS MAKING AND UNMAKING (1925).
"See Judd, Psychology of Social Institutions, 20 JR. OF AB. &. SoC. PsY-
CHOLOGY, 151 (1925); cf. also Dewey, Need for Social Psychology, PsY-
CHOLOGICAL REVIEW 266 (1917).4 See ELDRIDGE, POLITICAL ACTION (1924).
"Among the best may be mentioned GILLN, CRIMINOLOGY AND PENOLOGY
(1926); STUTSMAN, CURING THE CRIMINAL (1926); BARNES THE REPRESSION
OF CRIME (1926); PARSONS, CRIME AND THE CRIMINAL (1926).
"'Cf. Gillin, supra, 852; DARROW, CRIME, ITS CAUSE AND TREATMENT, ch.
36, 275 (1922); Barnes, supra, 298 ff.; Parsons, supra, ch. XIV; WATSON,
BEHAVIORISM, 144 (1925).
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charge that modern, up-to-date criminology and penology advocates a"coddling" attitude toward the criminal is grossly untrue and without
foundation. It is most frequently made by those who criticize theories
with which they are not familiar. Little of the serious literature on this
subject could be characterized as sentimental, unless the ambition to
relieve society of the criminal by removing his criminality, rather than
inflicting corporal punishment, can be termed sentimental. All pro-
ponents of the new criminology advocate a scientific treatment of the
subject and the subjection of the criminal to constant observation and
study. Science has seldom been accused of sentimentalism in its methods.
Usually its chief conflict is with the sentimentalists. Work is freely
advocated for the criminal, sometimes a more strenuous program in this
respect than most of us would accord the most vicious felon.49  Inde-
terminate sentences, measured by the success of the remaking or recondi-
tioning process, are recommended, the sentence to lapse into a life
sentence where the criminal is incurable or fails utterly to respond to
the socializing circumstances into which he is placed, regardless of the
exact nature and result of the crime. A scientific and rational program
of crime prevention is urged by all experts in this field.
In its attitude toward crime, perhaps, more than anywhere else the
law has been constantly guilty of refusing to take cognizance of scientific
materials. As Clarence Darrow has concluded, after a life full of
experience with criminals, "if doctors and scientists had been no wiser
than lawyers, judges, legislatures and the public, the world would still
be punishing imbeciles, the insane, the inferior and the sick; and treating
human ailments with incantations, witchcraft, force and magic. We
should still be driving devils out of the sick and into the swine." 50
It is clear that prisons must become clinics; prison farms must be
turned into laboratories; those in charge must be taught to tabulate and
preserve such data and statistics as will be necessary for trained men to
examine and to base conclusions upon. Reformatories and jails must
yield to institutions for the examination, differentiation, segregation,
treatment or extermination of the anti-social and the unfit.5' Surely the
older program of treating the criminal has utterly failed. Can there be
any sound reason, then, why science should not have its opportunity
here to solve the problem as it has been permitted to solve so many
problems elsewhere? Are there grounds to justify an intelligent profes-
sion in clinging to a tradition and to an outgrown order which has
proven so inadequate when materials for reasonable progress are available?
The integration of the different social sciences and some of the
allied exact sciences into a formidable array of scholars, specialists and
research workers is swiftly taking place. The lawyer alone, among those
most directly concerned, is conspicuously tardy to take active part in the
work, and more loath still to apply the results. The American Associa-
tion for the Advancement of Science brings together men interested in
different fields to map out common ground for cooperation. The Social
Science Research Council, in connection with which the law is happily
represented by such men as Felix Frankfurter and Learned Hand, has
4 9WATSON, BEHAVIORISM, 146.
'DARROW, CRIME, ITS CAUSE AND TREATMENT, 276 (1922).
'Cf. Barnes, supra, 375 ff.
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established a series of research fellowships through funds received for
such purpose from the Laura Spellman Rockefeller Memorial, and has
undertaken a definite program of sociological investigation.5 2
A movement is afoot to secure the establishment of a standardized
statistical service which gives indication of becoming a reality. The
purpose of this service will be (1) to present a sum total of social
efforts as expressed through all public and private social work, institutions
and agencies; (2) to enable social scientists to observe the prevailing
extent of social maladjustments and current changes; (3) to furnish
statistical guages to determine the effectiveness of the varied efforts at
social amelioration and of attempts at the prevention of conditions
causing social disorders; (4) to provide "indicators" through which ap-
proaching social maladjustments in society at large can be predicted with
a fair degree of accuracy. 53 The complete standardization of social
statistical matter is yet to be achieved, but the movement is under way
and in time must be realized, with inestimable advantages to those whose
efforts are directed to the scientific and intelligent control of social
processes.
The peculiar job for the lawyer is to work out some effective method
of utilizing this material and subjecting it to the service of the law. The
law must not only coordinate and apply this knowledge, but it must
keep in constant contact with these kindred fields to take quick and
immediate advantage of what further progress is made. There must be
some scientific method of correlating and adjusting all this matter so that
it might be brought to bear upon legal problems as the lawyer meets them
and directed into the proper legal channels in an orderly way.
III
The lawyer knows well enough that whatever progress is to be made
in the administration and application of law must come through the
orderly changes and growth that comes from within the institution itself.
The profession has always regarded without seriousness sweeping and
revolutionary programs suggested by -the layman in his enthusiasm for
attaining results which he has reason to believe desirable, but with vague
notions as to processes to attain them. We know that criminal justice
is not likely to be reformed by an immediate elimination of the jury
system, or by a wholesale discarding of rules of evidence, or by a
complete substitution of specialists and scientists for judges and courts.
We further have reason to believe that it is unlikely that legislatures will
suddenly turn over to psychologists the entire treatment and control of
the delinquent members of society. We are pretty sure that it will be
some time before sociologists will constitute a majority in both houses of
the General Assembly. On the civil side, we are confident that courts
will continue to feel it their duty to impose upon the public their notion
of reasonableness regarding statutes which threaten liberty and property
without due process of law and acts which curtail, to some extent, the
liberty of contract of certain economic groups. It is not to be expected
that in the very near future the consumer and the public utility will
cease to submit their disputes to the judgment of a court of law as to
the economic fairness in existing or proposed rates for certain com-
modities.
'See HANDBOOK, Ass. OF AM. LAw SCHOOLS, 98 ff. (1926).
"Frankel, Standardization of Social Statistics, 5 SOCIAL FORCES, 243 (1926).
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Whatever immediate use is to be made of science and the informa-
tion and knowledge which the scientist is compiling must be made
available to the processes of the law through existing and familiar
common law doctrines. It has been demonstrated that this is not a
possibility so remote that it does not justify thoughtful consideration. It
is to be remembered that nineteen years ago the Supreme Court of the
United States, in a memorable decision, announced that it would "take
judicial cognizance of all matters of general knowledge.154  There is
nothing particularly startling in this enunciation of a time honored legal
doctrine, but when it is made, as here, to include some several hundred
pages of statistical and sociological data,5 5 it takes on a new significance.
The sociological brief, as introduced by now Mr. Justice Brandeis, is but
an old method of making available to courts new and scientific facts.
It can be presumed that the "general knowledge" includes all matters
which are scientifically demonstrable. Thus the theory of judicial notice
may be employed to present to a judge matters that are peculiarly avail
able to the scientist only without doing violence to any of the traditional
and cherished conceptions of our law. In other words, a court may be
advised of matters which, were he a scientist, would be easily within his
grasp and probably within his knowledge.
But the statistical brief has limitations. It has not proven to be
the great boon that some had hoped for the accurate solution of socio-
legal problems. Chief among the drawbacks is the fact that the parties
to the litigation are doing the advising. Science is employed for partisan
ends, and thus loses much of its value. It is no longer science. It is
thus, not strange that in subsequent cases involving the constitutionality
of social legislation both sides to the controversy have employed this
device to apparently excellent advantage. In other words, there is a
strong tendency to reduce the value and accuracy of this type of
information to that of expert testimony, which always elicits a skeptical
shrug from the lawyer.
Nevertheless the defect here is not with the scientific value of
technical information, nor yet with the theory of judicial notice, but
with the unscientific manner of employing scientific knowledge. Such
knowledge is of the utmost value to the courts if some method were
devised of presenting the same to them.
The second doctrine, and necessary compliment to the theory of
judicial notice which contains tremendous possibilities for the improved
application of scientific materials to legal controversies, is the control
that the judge exercises over the jury. It is elementary that a new trial
may be granted, at the discretion of the court, when the verdict is
contrary to the weight of evidence, as reasonable men must weigh that
evidence. Verdicts may even be directed when, in view of the facts of
the case, the court would be obligated to grant a new trial in case of
an adverse verdict.56 The jury will not be permitted to return an
unreasonable verdict, in the light of facts and evidence available to it.
All matters of judicial notice may be considered as constituent parts of
the factual situation to be adjudicated. Thus technical advice to the
judge may as well be employed to counteract an obviously incorrect
"*Muller v. Oregon, 208 U. S. 412, 421 (1908).'For abstract of this brief, see ibid, 419, n. 1.
OPeople v. Hutchinson, 9 Fed. (2) 275 (1926); Froling v. Howard, 125
Me. 507, 131 Atl. 308 (1926).
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verdict, as to justify a reversal of the findings of the legislature when a
statute is under examination respecting its constitutionality. Scientific
data and facts which the notorious constitution of the jury would render
unavailing, may in such manner be directly brought to bear upon the
results of legal controversies.
Even in criminal cases, in spite of our traditional dogmas as to
double jeopardy, by simple legislative manipulation, the control of the
judge over the jury may correct many of the evils of the jury trial.
Notoriously the court, in criminal cases, has been inadequately clothed
with power,57 but under such statutes as those in Massachusetts which
legitimatize a verdict of "not guilty, by reason of insanity", it is possible
for the court to direct a verdict for defendant and still commit the
delinquent to an institution for years or for life.5" Thus information
which would, in many instances be discarded or disregarded by a jury,
may be used by the judge to correct or prevent an otherwise erroneous
verdict.
The final phase of such a problem is the exact nature of the in-
strumentality or agency through which this material, so widely scattered
and uncoordinated and related to practical legal problems, can reach the
courts. Obviously the task of adjusting and correlating the work of the
separate sciences so that it may be brought to bear directly to achieve
the ends of law must be done by lawyers, with an eye to the specific
and technical facilities of the legal system. There is no place where this
could be done more expeditiously and more economically than in the
State University Law School. There and perhaps there alone conditions
are ideal for research and the atmosphere free, for the most part, from
political and class pressure.
As to the other fields involved, it must be remembered that the
state is already paying salaries to men, in each science, who are pre-
sumably skilled and well qualified in the technique of their respective
disciplines. Those at the Law School are in close and immediate contact
with these men and their laboratories of work. Cooperation is not only
possible, but coordinated work is invited by the conditions. These men
are engaged in the double task of teaching and conducting and directing
researches. Science, as a whole, and the individual himself profit from
this work. So does the University, and, it follows, the state. But this
latter profit is indirect. Why should not the state demand that it be
entitled to the direct and immediate advantage of this time and research,
by some regular and systematic direction and organization thereof? In
other words, may not the state demand first consideration in the direction
which the research work of its scientists and professors shall take?
This could be attained by the creation of a bureau which may be
described as a Bureau of Legal and Legislative Research. At the head
of this bureau, directing and organizing the work, should be a lawyer,
probably a professor in the Law School. A man of broad training and
scientific insight, with some reduction of teaching hours, could direct the
entire activities of such a board. Members of the bureau should include
the heads of the different departments of the University which could
lend active assistance. A definite number of hours of research per week
"See MOLEY, THE MISSOURI CRIME SURVEY, Report IV by A. V. Lashly
(1926).
'GENERAL LAWS, ch. 278, sec. 13.
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could be demanded of these men, or their departments, which would in
no way interfere with their teaching duties, nor increase the amount of
work which they are expected to do under present conditions. Among
their number should be included the head of the medical school, the head
of the biology department, the head of the psychology department, the
heads of the chemistry department, of the physics department, of the
sociology department, and of the department of economics. A statistician
must also be included as must be some members of the Agricultural
College. The time that these men now spend in research, commendable
but promiscuous and unrelated to the particular needs of the state and
community, could be directed along lines which could be made im-
mediately or ultimately serviceable to the law-making and law administra-
tion facilities of the state.
By far sighted and intelligent direction, an immediate program could
be instituted which, by organized work could prepare material to have a
direct bearing upon present and future problems of law and legislation
in this state. Material could be accumulated and data obtained and filed
which would always be available to subserve the ends of the legislature
and the courts. Studies of comparative legislation could be continually
under way and the results of the same observed and evaluated, so that
North Dakota might profit by the mistakes and successes of other states
as well as from her own experience. The state would have its experts
working directly in its service and devoting their entire time and effort
to the working out of its local problems and to the acquisition of a
scientific foundation for their wise solution.
This bureau could act in an advisory capacity to the legislature and
to the courts. In the first capacity, it could certainly render inestimable
service in investigating social conditions and making recommendations as
to their alleviation. It could work upon the crime problem, treatment of
criminals and measures for a systematic preventative program. It could
study and assimilate the work of experimenters all over the country, in
different institutions, both public and private. In short it could act as a
clearing house for all scientific information in the various fields which
bear upon legislative problems. Upon the basis of this material, recom-
mendations might be made to the legislature and the science of legislation
become, at least in part, a reality.
It is unlikely that legislatures are going to quietly turn over to any
committee of college professors the sacred duties which have been en-
trusted to them. Legislators are far too conscientious, for that. But it
is not impossible for such a group of scientific men to perform such
effective work and render such obviously priceless service to the public
as to seduce the respect of legislators, and eventually the confidence of
the public generally. As soon as this latter is accomplished, legislatures
will weigh long and consider well before utterly disregarding the recom-
mendations of such a bureau.
It is easy to demonstrate that "every beneficient change in legislation
comes from a fresh study of social conditions and of social ends, and
from some rejection of obsolete law to make room for a rule which fits
the facts. One can hardly escape the conviction that a lawyer who has
not studied economics and sociology is very apt to become a public
enemy." 59 It has been some years since these words were written by an
"Henderson, 11 AM. JR. oF Soc. 847 (1906).
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intelligent student of social institutions, but their truth is now more
obvious than ever.
As to the direct service of such a group to the courts, in brief, it
is possible for it to perform the same function that under our present
practice is performed by the sociological brief and expert witnesses, with
an infinitely wider field in which to function. The bureau could act
only in an advisory capacity. Courts could submit hypothetical questions
to the director, who, in turn, submits the same to the particular scientist
interested. The answer, from available data where possible, or after
experiment and investigation, may be returned to the judge together with
written memoranda of the reasons therefore and an abstract of the
scientific principles underlying those reasons. Where possible, the facts
and data can be sent to the court with explanations, permitting him to
make his own conclusions from those facts. Intelligent courts will be
able to anticipate many such problems before time for a decision. In
certain cases specialists can be sent to different venues to conduct
examinations or investigations where such can be conducted only there.
Especially valuable could be this procedure in criminal trials, for the
trial court through competent technical advise and a little legislative
latitude can do much to forward the application of the principle of
individualized punishment of crimes.60 The Supreme Court, of course,
could have ample time to submit troublesome questions which are ap-
parent upon the record, and await the bureau's answer, in the form of
a report or advisory opinion as I have indicated.
Some of the advantages of such a bureau'as this must be patent to
all. The members of the same are specialists, devoting their entire time
to the particular field of knowledge in which they are interested. Such
questions as are submitted to them would be attacked in a perfectly
objective way, from an unprejudiced and unbiased point of view, in so
far as such is humanly possible. These men are working under condi-
tions conducive to producing scientific results, unpolluted by political
influence and, to a large extent free from class partisanship. In many
problems, submitted by courts hypothetically, the scientist and research
man will have little notion of the purpose or application of his work.
His findings and advice should be welcomed by the courts, and would,
I make bold to predict, be taken into account in an ever increasing degree.
By no means unimportant is the matter of expense entailed at the
beginning of such an experiment. It would be comparatively nominal.
The personnel of the bureau is already available, in the employ of the
state. A slight reduction of teaching hours, particularly for the director,
upon whom the heaviest duties would obviously fall, slight expenditures
for secretarial and office assistance would be all that would be required
to launch the enterprise. Laboratories, libraries, equipment and workers
are at hand. Great quantities of valuable material are accumulating.
Only the organization and coordination of this work by lawyers and the
presentment of the same to our lawmakers, both legislative and judicial,
is necessary. No revolutionary or even novel theories or doctrines are
needed to make such provisions. But trifling expense is entailed in
"0Cf. Bates. What May Be Done to Forward the Judicious Application of
the Principle of Individualization of Punishment, etc., 16 JR. CR. L. & CR. 477
(1926). For the present status of advising courts through scientific tests as




starting a process which has tremendous possibilities for increasing the
effectiveness with which courts and legislators may perform their work
The need for some such action is imperative and obvious. There is
great profit to be derived, and nothing to lose.
In North Dakota conditions are particularly propitious for such an
experiment. The volume of litigation is not so great but that reasonably
accurate observation could be made of the comparative value of the work
of such a bureau. Over the space of a few years definite conclusions
could be drawn, and necessary corrections and adjustments made. The
criminal problem in this state is not so acute but that this bureau could,
with a limited number of members, give adequate attention to it, although
this might not be possible were the volume of criminal cases much
larger. The population of the state is not so unwieldy that it would
prevent effective administration of any rational preventative program
which the bureau might advocate and the legislature adopt.
Further, and quite as important, the state prides itself upon the high
standard of its bar and the intelligence of its judiciary. We have no
occasion to apologize for or to mistrust our legislature. It undoubtedly
strives to cooperate with the bar and to weigh seriously measures
championed by it. The state is definitely alligned with the more pro-
gressive communities and we take a just pride in' our educational in-
stitutions. It is in such a jurisdiction that some plan similar to the one
I have outlined might be expected a trial. It is not, nor is it intended
to be a radical or unique scheme. Similar plans, though perhaps not so
inclusive nor yet so concrete, have been suggested by outstanding legal
scholars.6 I have tried to offer a sane, but it is to be hoped effective
plan to definitely allign science and the scientific method with law and
government, and to utilize, in behalf of society and of the state, those
instrumentalities and agencies already at its disposal, but awaiting the
work which only the legal profession can perform, to harness them to
the specific task of serving their master well. The defects of the plan,
perhaps obvious to most of you, may I suggest, could be best remedied
by putting the scheme into operation.
'See address by Dean Henry M. Bates before Nebraska State Bar Asso-
ciation, 1926.
